During the last two decades, the Internet has changed people's habits and improved their daily life activities and services. In particular, the emergence of e-commerce provided manufactures and vendors with more business opportunities. This allowed customers to benefit from a global, quicker and cheaper shopping environment. However, e-commerce is evolving from a centralised approach, where consumers directly purchase products and services from businesses, to a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) perspective, in which customers buy and sell goods amongst themselves. In P2P scenarios, it is crucial to protect both buyers and sellers (the peers) from being victimised by possible fraud arising from the uncertainties, vagueness and ambiguities that characterise the interactions amongst unknown business entities. For this reason, the so-called reputation models are becoming a key architectural component of any e-commerce portal. These systems are intended to evaluate the basic features of each entity (buyer, seller, goods, etc.) involved in a given trading transaction in order to assess the trust level of the given transaction and minimise fraud. However, in spite of their wide deployment, the reputation models need to be enhanced to handle the various sources of uncertainties in order to produce more accurate outputs which will allow to increase the trust and decrease the fraud levels within e-commerce systems. In this paper, we present an interval type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management in (P2P) e-commerce which is capable of better handling the faced uncertainties. We have carried out various experiments based on eBay ® -like transaction datasets which have shown that the proposed type-2 fuzzy logic based system can provide better performance (in terms of malicious peer detection and exchanged message overhead) when compared to the other well-known and heavily used approaches like the eBay ® approach, EigenTrust, PeerTrust as well as the type-1 fuzzy based counterpart approach.
Introduction

1
The Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW) improved the lifestyle of people from all over the World in different aspects of 2 everyday life activities and services. Thanks to mobile network technologies, people can now get access from anywhere and at 3 The main goal of reputation models is to compute and associate a reputation value to each peer by using the community- 23 based opinions in order to allow buyers/sellers to undertake more reliable transactions. Three core components are used to build 24 any reputation system: (1) the trust value that each peer has for another peer involved in at least one transaction with it; (2) the 25 distribution method that propagates these values in the P2P network; (3) the reputation score that each peer aggregates from the 26 trust values gathered from all the peers interacting with it [2] . The quality of a reputation-based P2P trust management system is 27 depending on its capability in performing an accurate and effective identification of malicious peers, and in efficiently reducing 28 the bandwidth usage of the P2P network. 29 Due to the importance of their role in enabling safety in P2P e-commerce paradigm, there has been a fervent development 30 of such systems. In particular, after some first attempts to model reputation concepts as crisp values, recently, the uncertain and 31 imprecise nature of commercial transactions opened the way for promising applications of fuzzy logic theory to this important 32 research area (see Section 2). Nevertheless, the precise identification of malicious peers and the consequent improvement of 33 safety in trade transactions is far from being completely solved. 34 In this paper, we aim at bridging this gap by introducing a collection of e-commerce trustworthiness metrics starting from 35 which to design an innovative reputation model and its implementation based on the type-2 fuzzy sets theory [3] [4] [5] . Different 36 from conventional Mamdani or TSK type-1 fuzzy systems, type-2 fuzzy sets provide additional design degrees of freedom, which 37 can achieve better performance in domains where lots of uncertainties are present [6] , such as P2P e-commerce environments. 38 Indeed, thanks to its capability to handle high level of uncertainty, the proposed framework is capable of performing a deep and 39 precise analysis of all the different parameters involved in a given trading transaction and assessing the right reputation value 40 for each peer belonging to a P2P e-commerce system. 41 We have carried out various experiments based on eBay ® -like transaction datasets to compare, in an empirical and statistical 42 way, the proposed system with other well-known and widely used approaches, such as the eBay ® paradigm (used in the most 43 known e-market platform eBay ® ), EigenTrust and PeerTrust (which are two of the most cited reputation management systems in 44 P2P environments), as well as, a type-1 fuzzy based approach. As shown by these comparisons, the proposed type-2 fuzzy logic 45 based system yields better performance than state-of-the-art approaches in terms of malicious peer detection and exchanged 46 message overhead. 47 The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reports a detailed description of the state-of-the-art about the repu-48 tation management systems; Section 3 will present the background knowledge including an overview on the reputation man-49 agement issues in P2P e-commerce systems and a brief description of type-2 FLSs; Section 4 presents the proposed interval 50 type-2 fuzzy logic based framework for reputation management; Section 5 presents the experiments and results while Section 6 51 presents the conclusions and future work. 53 Reputation management systems play a crucial role in allowing the existence and efficiency of e-commerce thanks to their 54 capability to defend sellers and customers from on-line frauds. In literature, several paradigms have been proposed with the goal 55 to provide on-line community with even more efficient reputation management systems. The eBay ® reputation-based P2P trust 56 management system is the most popular trust-management system and it is a based a user feedback approach [7] that enables 57 eBay ® users to evaluate the reputation value of their trading peers, and store these values to a centralised reputation database. 58 EigenTrust [8] is one of the most widely accepted paradigms for reputation management in distributed environments. Trust paradigm computes the trust score by summing the satisfactions of the transaction with each peer and then normalises it 60 over all its peers [8] . Then, it calculates the reputation value of a peer by aggregating the trust values assigned to it by other peers, 61 weighted by the reputations of the assigning peers. The trust scores are distributed in the P2P network by using a Distributed Hash Table ( DHT)-overlay network [9] . In [10], the PeerTrust paradigm was presented to overcome the drawbacks of EigenTrust in 63 controlling the man-in-the-middle attack [11] as it uses overlay for trust propagation and public-key infrastructure for securing 64 remote scores. In addition, the PeerTrust was the first to introduce the concept of feedback creditability to aggregate the global 65 reputation.
Related works
66
The above mentioned paradigms have mainly employed crisp logic which cannot easily handle the different uncertainties, 67 vagueness and ambiguities that characterise the interactions occurring amongst unknown business entities in P2P systems 68 (for more details see Section 3.2). Type-1 fuzzy logic was employed to develop a first fuzzy based reputation system, namely 69 FuzzyTrust [12] . FuzzyTrust works by performing two inference steps: (1) trust score calculation where each peer performs a 70 fuzzy inference on local parameters to generate trust scores towards the other peers and (2) reputation aggregation where each 71 peer performs a weighted aggregation of the trust scores received from all peers to produce a reputation value. The propaga-72 tion of trust scores is executed by using a Distributed Hash Hereafter, firstly, we present the new model defining a set of formal metrics for evaluating the concepts of reputation, trust 179 and credibility in uncertain environments and, then, we describe the architecture of the proposed type-2 fuzzy logic based 180 reputation management system and all its components. 
191
In order to achieve these goals, the proposed model for reputation management in P2P e-commerce focuses on three main Table 1 Definitions of different kinds of the trust.
Trust typology Definition
Transaction Trust The trust that a peer has towards another one by considering only the newest transaction that occurred between them.
Historical Trust
The trust that a peer has towards another one before the last transaction between them.
Overall Trust
The trust computed by a peer towards another one by considering all transactions that occurred between them.
Table 2
Metrics influencing transaction trust.
Metric Definition
Metrics used by a buyer Goods Quality The quality assessed by the buyer about the received goods. Delivery Time
The amount of time required to receive goods.
Seller Communication Quality
The quality assessed by the buyer about the seller's readiness and availability at communicating. Shipping Service Reliability
The objective reliability provided through the shipping service used by the seller.
Metrics used by a seller Payment Time
The amount of the time required to receive buyer's payment Payment Method Reliability
The objective reliability provided by the payment method used by the buyer.
Buyer Communication Quality
The quality assessed by the seller about the buyer's readiness and availability at communicating.
Table 3
Factors influencing the overall trust.
Metric Definition
Historical Trust Date It represents the date when the historical trust value was computed. This factor allows to discriminate between new and old experiences and to give more relevance to the transaction trust.
Last Transaction Amount
It represents the price of the goods involved in the last transaction between two peers. This factor supports the detection of oscillatory behaviours (i.e. behaviours characterised by a lot of honest and cheap transactions and a few malicious and expensive ones).
of new experiences from old ones, the proposed model computes the transaction trust by only considering metrics that do not Table 4 Factors influencing weights associated to the overall trust. Q3
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Metric Definition
Credibility The willingness of the commentator peer to provide a correct opinion towards the target one.
Opinion Date
The date when the commentator user computed the overall trust value for the target one. Opinion Scope
The number of transactions on which the commentator user computed the overall trust value for the target one. Average Amount
The average price of goods involved in the transactions, on which the commentator user computed the overall trust value for the target one. 
The interval type-2 fuzzy architecture for reputation management
232
The proposed interval type-2 fuzzy system for reputation management works by using a hierarchical and incremental ap- another one (in this case acting as target peer) with whom it has just closed a trade transaction. It is implemented through a 246 hierarchical Interval Type-2 Fuzzy Logic Systems (IT2FLSs) which computes, at the low level, the transaction trust value and, at 247 the top level, the overall trust value over the peer with whom it has just closed the transaction.
248
The Reputation Aggregation Subsystem is used by a target peer to compute its own reputation (representing the final output of 249 the proposed type-2 fuzzy set based reputation management framework). In order to compute such value, a target peer performs based on the reputation value of the target peer just computed. In detail, the credibility value of a commentator peer is increased 258 if its opinion (overall trust value) over the target peer is near to the new computed reputation for the target peer, decreased vice 259 versa.
260
The Hereafter, more details about the architecture modules and the interactions among them are given. Table 2 . 279 The rule base 3 of the lower IT2FLS for a seller peer is composed from 108 rules which were inspired by the paradigm where 280 the higher the quality of goods and the shorter the delivery time and the higher the seller communication quality and the higher 281 the shipping service reliability, the higher is the value of the transaction trust. When the target peer acts as buyer in the last 282 transaction, the lower layer IT2FLS will have different inputs (reflecting the metrics used by a seller reported in the (1) the higher the amount of the last transaction, the higher is the importance of the transaction trust value; (2) the newer the 293 date of the historical trust and the higher is the importance of the historical trust value. 
Reputation Aggregation Subsystem
303
The Reputation Aggregation Subsystem is used by a peer to compute its own reputation value which is a real number within is an IT2FLS (shown in Fig. 6 ). According to the metrics reported in the where CR old is the current credibility value of the peer, error is the difference between the given opinion and the new computed 342 reputation, is the tolerance value, Inc is the maximal possible increment and Dec is the maximal possible decrement. In par-343 ticular, in the proposed system, we set Inc to 0.05 and Dec to 0.2. The choice to set Dec > Inc is derived from human perception, 344 according to which it is harder to gain credibility than to loose it [43] . As for the variable , it is set to 0.3 because such value 345 causes a peer to move between two different trust levels (represented by fuzzy sets in Fig. 5(c)) . Therefore, the system we pro-346 pose tolerates an error which does not lead to a change in the overall trust level of a peer. After computing the new credibility 347 value for all the commentator peers, the target peer sends these values to the corresponding ones which store them. Table 5 reports the description of each field contained in these tables in a detailed way. Moreover, each peer keeps track of its 375 own reputation value and its own credibility. 
Trusted E-commerce Database
The proposed type-2 fuzzy logic based reputation system at work
377
In this section, we analyse the functioning of the proposed reputation management system after a transaction between a 378 seller S and a buyer B. For sake of exposition simplicity, let us consider S as the target peer and the set (S) = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n }, 
Experiments and results
389
In this section, we will report various experiments which were conducted to illustrate the benefits of the proposed system in • Hypocritical: the malicious peer misbehaves and gives unfairly low recommendation with x percent probability [8, 47] . In 419 other times, it behaves as a good peer;
420
• Oscillatory: the malicious peer builds its own high reputation by being good for a long time period, during which, it per- Table 6 shows the details of the number of peers involved in all planned experimental sessions. 430 Hereafter, the details about the performed experiments are given.
431
ARTICLE IN PRESS
JID: INS [m3Gsc;November 19, 2015;11:52]
Table 6
Number of peers characterising the datasets used by all planned experimental sessions. 
Dataset name Number of peers
MaliciousDataset_1_5 514 MaliciousDataset_1_10 538 MaliciousDataset_1_20 587 MaliciousDataset_2_5 2411 MaliciousDataset_2_10 2537 MaliciousDataset_2_20 2768 MaliciousDataset_3_5 4727 MaliciousDataset_3_10 4952 MaliciousDataset_3_20 5403
Evaluation of the proposed reputation management system
432
In this section, we analyse the capability of the proposed reputation management system in detecting malicious peers. As 433 described in Section 4.2.2, our system considers a peer as malicious when it is characterised by a reputation value labelled with 434 the Low linguistic term. The performance of our system is measured through the use of two well-established metrics, namely 435 Precision and Recall. Precisely, in reputation scenario, precision and recall are defined as follows:
where tp is the number of true positives, i.e., the number of malicious peers which are correctly identified as malicious, fp is the 438 number of false positives, i.e., the number of good peers that are identified as malicious, and fn is the number of the false negatives, Table 7 shows the Precision malicious and Recall malicious values obtained by the proposed reputation management system by 445 considering all created malicious datasets. Table 8 shows the detection rate (which is computed using the Recall malicious ) in 446 percentage for each kind of malicious peer by considering the same nine datasets. 447 As shown in the Table 7 , the proposed system yields good performance, being characterised by an average Precision malicious 448 equals to 0.87 and an average Recall malicious equals to 0.86. 
Comparative study with the state-of-the-art paradigms
450
In this section, we compare of the proposed system with EigenTrust, PeerTrust and the eBay ® feedback reputation manage-451 ment system as well as type-1 its fuzzy counterpart. In particular, among PeerTrust variants, we consider PeerTrust PSM since 452 it represents the most performing variant as described in [10] . The comparison is carried out by considering three experimental 453 sessions. Firstly, we perform a statistical comparative study based on the malicious peer detection rate measured in terms of 454 Precision malicious and Recall malicious (see Eqs. 3 and 4, respectively). Secondly, we perform a comparative study evaluating the num- Table 9 Strategies to detect malicious peers adopted by the compared reputation management systems.
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Reputation management system
Strategy eBay ® A peer is malicious when it is characterised by a negative feedback score. EigenTrust Due to its probabilistic interpretation of reputation, a peer is malicious when it is characterised by a global trust value less than 1/N, where N is the number of peers in the network. PeerTrust A peer is malicious when it is characterised by a global trust value less than or equal to 1 − mrate, where mrate represents the average number of malicious transactions made by each malicious peer. Type-1 FLS A peer is malicious when it is characterised by a reputation value labelled with the Low linguistic term. Our system A peer is malicious when it is characterised by a reputation value labelled with the Low linguistic term.
Comparison in terms of malicious peer detection rate
458
In this section, we show the results of the comparison between the proposed system and the other paradigms in terms of 459 precision and recall in the detection of malicious peer.
460
Precision and recall generally vary inversely; that is, as precision increases, recall generally decreases, and vice versa. For this 461 reason, it can be very difficult to achieve high recall and high precision simultaneously [48] . As shown in this section through an 462 empirical comparison followed by a statistical test, the proposed system improves state-of-the-art because it is able to yield high 463 recall without losing in precision.
464
In order to perform our comparison, it is necessary to highlight how each compared algorithms detect a malicious peer.
465 Table 9 summarises the strategy used by each compared reputation management system to detect malicious peer. It is possible 466 to note that, different from our system and the type-1 FLS, eBay ® feedback system, PeerTrust and EigenTrust do not provide a 467 formal method for identifying malicious peers, but they just compute a peer ranking based on their reputation value.
468
In Tables 10 and 11 α computed by using aforementioned ranks must be equal to or greater than the tabled 490 critical chi-square value at the specified level of significance [52] .
491
In our experimentation, the most used level of significance α equal to 0.05 is set. The data sample for each compared system 492 is composed of nine items for each performance measure, one for each considered dataset. In other words, data reported in 493   Tables 10 and 11 are used as data samples. This section is devoted to compare the proposed system with the state-of-the-art paradigms in a simulated operative scenario.
520
The comparison is carried out by taking into account the number of frauds which occurs in typical eBay ® auctions even though 521 the aforementioned reputation management systems are used.
522
An auction is a public sale of goods in which prospective buyers take bids and the item is sold to the highest bidder. Unfortu- fies the potential malicious peers in the set of generated buyers, by using its own specific technique as shown in Table 15 illustrates the results of this experiment which consists of performing 1000 independent auctions. The number of 536 malicious peers winning an auction is expressed as a percentage. As can be seen from In this section, we compare the proposed reputation management system and EigenTrust in terms of message overhead by 541 considering the employed datasets. The message overhead is a useful metric to understand the suitability of the reputation 542 management systems in P2P environments where reducing network overload is a crucial factor to avoid network congestion.
543
The comparison excludes eBay ® because its reputation functionalities are based on a centralised website approach. Therefore, 544 eBay ® does not exchange messages to evaluate the peers' reputation and, as a consequence, it is not comparable (in terms of 545 message overhead) with a full P2P approach as the proposed system and EigenTrust. At the same way, PeerTrust is excluded by 546 this comparison since it does not make known the used message exchange scheme. Finally, the reputation management system 547 based on type-1 fuzzy systems is excluded from this comparison because it is based on the same message exchange mechanism 548 provided by the proposed reputation management system. The results of this experiment are shown in Table 16 . Fig. 8 shows 549 a plot of the number of messages that the two compared systems exchange after each transaction belonging to the dataset 550 MaliciousDataset_1_5. By analysing the average message overhead per peer, it was found that our proposed system transmits 56 551 messages with a standard deviation of 256, compared to 3584 messages, with a standard deviation of 2144, transmitted per peer 552 by using EigenTrust.
553
As shown in the Table 16 , our system exchanges a number of messages always lesser than that required by EigenTrust. In 554 particular, the average relative improvement in percentage is equal to 99.11%. This result makes our proposal particularly suitable 555 to be embedded in next generation of P2P e-commerce networks that, different from the eBay ® portal, will be implemented by 556 means of a pure distributed approach where the overhead related to the message exchange will play a key role for improving the 557 performance of the overall system.
558
The high message overhead characterising EigenTrust is due to the notion of transitive trust which causes the updating of 559 reputation values for all peers after each transaction. Moreover, the number of exchanged messages characterising the proposed 560 reputation system is held furthermore low thanks to the storing of information in memory tables (as described in Section 4).
561
However, it is important to note that this feature does not represent a weakness for our system considering the storage capabili- 
Conclusions and future work
565
The Internet is changing the life style of people from all over the World thanks to its capabilities to provide smart services, 
575
In this paper, we presented a type-2 fuzzy logic based reputation management system which can handle the various faced 576 uncertainties, vagueness and ambiguities to produce better reputation management (when compared to the fuzzy and non fuzzy 577 based reputation management systems) in terms of malicious peer detection and exchanged message overhead. The benefits 578 provided by the developed framework have been tested on a real data sets of eBay ® transactions in order to show the superiority 579 of the proposed paradigm when compared to the state-of-the-art paradigms. In particular, the proposed system is the only 580 system that achieves, simultaneously, high level of precision and recall in detecting malicious peers as shown by a multiple 581 comparison statistical test. Besides, the proposed system outperforms the type-1 fuzzy based system, the eBay ® reputation 582 system, PeerTrust and EigenTrust in a simulated eBay ® scenario, with an average relative improvement in percentage that is equal 583 to 62.80%, 52.15%, 66.60% and 81.98%, respectively. Moreover, the proposed system exchanges a number of messages always lesser 584 than EigenTrust, precisely, the average relative improvement in percentage on all employed datasets is equal to 99.11%, making 585 our reputation management system particularly suitable to be embedded in a pure P2P network.
586
For our future work, we intend to integrate adaptive systems with the proposed approach in order to autonomously and 587 proactively adapt the behaviour of the reputation system when the behaviour of malicious peers changes or new and unexpected 588 malicious behaviours occur. 
